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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This action comes before this Court on appeal from a decision of the district court sitting 
in its appellate capacity. The district court overturned a magistrate court decision issued by the 
Honorable Dayo Onanubosi in which the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter 
"the State"), Bureau of Child Support, obtained a renewed child support judgment against 
Respondent Debra A. Peterson (hereinafter "Peterson") on behalf of her ex-husband Myron. The 
district court decision was based upon a conclusion by the Honorable Molly J. Huskey holding 
that any uncodified provisions of a session law do not carry the force and effect of law. 
2. Course of Proceedings Below 
This matter was initiated by the State filing its Motion for Entry of Renewed Child 
Support Judgment (hereinafter "the State's Motion") together with a supporting affidavit on 
August 10,2011. CR, pp. 24-30) In the State's Motion the State sought to renew judgment for 
the unpaid child suppOli obligations arising under the magistrate court's original orders in the 
total amount of seven thousand one hundred twenty-five dollars and one cent ($7,125.01). (R, p. 
28) Thereafter, the State filed a lHemorandum in Support of lHotion for Renewed Child Support 
Judgment on December 7, 2011. (R, pp. 31-35) 
Peterson filed her response to the State's Motion on or about December 12,2011 but did 
not submit any affidavits or other evidence in support of her arguments, or to refute any of the 
evidence submitted by the State. (R, pp. 36-54) On February 15, 2012 the State filed a Reply 
Brief in Support of Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment. (R, pp. 55-62) The magistrate 
court heard the initial oral argument with regard to this matter on the afternoon of February 17, 
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2012. (Tr. Vol. 1). After hearing from both parties, Judge Onanubosi stated his ruling in open 
cOUli finding in the State's favor. (T1'. Vol. I, p. 21, L. 17 through p. 23, L. 2). 
On March 1,2012, Peterson filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (R, pp. 63-66) Again 
Peterson forewent submitting any affidavits or other evidence in support of her arguments. (R, 
pp. 63-66) On April 4, 2012, the State submitted its Brief in Opposition to Motion to 
Reconsider, which was followed on May 3, 2012 by a Supplemental Argument submitted by 
Peterson. (R, pp. 67-74) Judge Onanubosi heard oral argument on the Motion for 
Reconsideration on May 24, 2012 and once again issued his ruling in open court reaftIrming his 
decision to renew judgment against Peterson. (T1'. Vol. II, p. 8, L. 13 through p. 9, L. 7). 
Pursuant to the trial court's request the State prepared the Final Order on Motion for 
Renewed Judgment which was subsequently signed by the trial court on July 10, 2012. (R., pp. 
78-81) Peterson had previously filed her Notice of Appeal on June 29, 2012. (R., pp. 75-77) 
Peterson filed Appellant's Brief on Appealfrom Magistrate's Court on December 10,2012. (R., 
pp.82-133) Thereafter, the State's Respondent's Briefwas filed on February 11,2013. CR., pp. 
134-167) Then, Peterson filed her Appellant's Reply Brief on Appeal from Magistrate's Court 
on February 25,2013. CR., pp. 168-180) 
The district court issued its Order on Motion to File the Renewed Judgment and Order to 
Remand (hereinafter "the district court order") on April 19, 2013 without taking oral argument. 
(R., pp. 181-189) The State filed its Notice of Appeal on May 16, 2013. (R., pp. 190-195) 
Peterson filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on May 24, 2013. (R., pp. 196-198) This Court has 
since issued an order dismissing Peterson's cross appeal on August 8, 2013. 
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3. Statement of Facts 
Erik Peterson was born . (R., p. 5, L1. 10-11) Peterson is Erik's mother 
and was required to pay ongoing support for Erik's benefit in the monthly amount of one 
hundred thirty-four dollars ($134.00) beginning October 1, 1997. (R., p. 21) When this action 
was commenced the total unpaid supp0l1 owed by Ms. Peterson was seven thousand one hundred 
twenty-five dollars and one cent ($7,125.01). (R., p. 28) 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. All provisions of a bill passed by the legislature carry the force and etTect of law whether 
or not those provisions are coditied in the Idaho Code. 
2. The district court erred in holding that the retroactivity provision in Section 5 of 2011 
Idaho Session Laws Chapter 104 as amended was not substantive legislation that stood on equal 
footing with those provisions of Chapter 104 codified in the Idaho Code. 
3. The district court erred in holding that the January 1998 child support judgment entered 
against Respondent could not be renewed under Idaho Code § 10-1111 pursuant to a request 
filed in August 2011 by Appellant with respect to delinquent payments due for Erik. 
4. The district court erred in reversing the magistrate court's decision that renewed the child 
support judgment against Peterson. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This C0U11 has been very clear in recent decisions concerning the standard of review 
when reviewing a decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity. This Court reviews 
the magistrate court record to insure that the magistrate's findings of fact are supported by the 
evidence and if the magistrate's conclusions are properly drawn based upon those facts. Pelayo 
v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, _ , 303 P.3d 214, 217 (2013). After evaluating the magistrate 
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record, this Court must affirm or reverse the decision of the district court based upon the merits 
of the district court decision. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970,973 (2012) 
This Court will exercise free review over any decisions of the district court relating to the 
construction or application of statutes and legislative language. Hayden Lake Fire Protection 
District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 400, III P.3d 73, 85 (2005). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
1. The district court's decision that the retroactivity provision of 2011 Idaho Session 
Laws Chapter 104 as amended, did not carry the force and effect of law ignored the 
plainly stated purpose of the legislation and did not follow existing law from the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
In 2011 the Idaho Legislature sought to remedy a situation in which unscrupulous parents 
were avoiding paying their support obligations until such time that the underlying support 
obligations became uncollectable. In order to achieve this goal the 2011 Idaho legislature passed 
two bills which resulted in amendments to Idaho Code §§ 5-245, 10-1110 and 10-1111 extending 
the timeframe in which unpaid support could be collected. 2011 Idaho Session Laws §§ 104 and 
331 (hereinafter "the 2011 amendments"). In addition to the altering the language of the three 
code sections, the 2011 amendments included a retroactivity provision which provided: 
[T]his act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and approval, 
and retroactively to July 1, 1995, and shall apply to all orders currently being 
enforced by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Child Support Program 
such that any Idaho judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired 
since July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or before December 30, 2011. 
2011 Idaho Session Laws § 104, Section 5 as amended by 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 331. 
In issuing the district court order, Judge Huskey ruled that the Department could not rely 
upon this retroactivity provision to renew the unpaid balance of child suppOli owed by Peterson. 
In coming to that decision the district court held the retroactivity provision was merely 
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legislative history and only the provisions codified in the Idaho Code were entitled to the force 
and effect of law. (R., p. 185-186). 
The district court erred in coming to that conclusion, particularly in light of the fact it is 
the Session Laws of the state of Idaho that are the complete and official record of Idaho 
legislative acts. This Court has previously addressed the importance of the Session Laws when 
evaluating the application and interpretation of legislation. In 2002 when evaluating the 
importance of the "Official Comments" to the provision of the UPC codified in Idaho Code § 28-
2-309 the Court stated, "The Comments are not authoritative, because they were not contained in 
the session law that adopted Idaho Code § 28-2-309." Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit }v!anufacturing 
Co., 137 Idaho 330, 335,48 P.3d 659 (2002) (emphasis added). As such the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that all provisions of enacting session laws are authoritative. 
Even more directly on point, this Court has previously relied upon the uncodified 
provisions of a bill and the resulting session law for the specific purpose offered in this case. In 
1996, this Court looked to a session law to confirm the Idaho legislature's intent to apply a 
statute retroactively. 
Although the district court did not have the benefit of I.C. § 41-1839(4) when it 
awarded attorney fees to Union under § 12-120(3), a statute will be applied 
retroactively where there is a clear legislative intent to that effect. Gailey v. 
Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 432,745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987) (citations 
omitted). In this case, the legislature has expressly stated its intent that "[t]his act 
shall apply to all cases pending at the time of its passage and approval." H.R. 713, 
1996 S.L., ch. 385. 
Union Warehouse and Supply Co., Inc. v. Illinois R.B. Jones, Inc., 128 Idaho 660, 669, 917 P.2d 
1300, 1309 (1996). Similarly to the instant case, the retroactivity provision referenced in Union 
Warehouse was contained only in Section 2 of 1996 Idaho Session Laws § 385 and was never 
codified in the Idaho Code. 
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The district court erred in holding that the retroactivity clause from the 2011 amendments 
was merely legislative history. This Court should reverse the district court's decision and 
reinstate the magistrate court order renewing the unpaid portion of Ms. Peterson's child support 
obligation for Erik. 
2. The clear language of the 2011 amendments, when considered as a whole, authorizes 
the renewal of the judgment against Ms. Peterson. 
The renewal of the child support judgment in this matter was appropriate as it was 
specifically allowed by the express terms of the 2011 amendments. As previously discussed, the 
2011 amendments were passed with a specific retroactivity clause. The Affidavit in Support of 
l"tfotion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment filed in this matter on August 10, 2011 set 
forth a statement of facts meeting all of the retroactivity criteria from the 2011 amendments. R., 
pp.27-29. 
Peterson has argued that the plain language of the statute mandates that the judgment in 
her case cannot be renewed. However, in making that argument, Peterson reads the substantive 
provisions of the 2011 amendments in isolation from the retroactivity clause. This analysis is in 
opposition to this Court's prior rulings on how statutes should be analyzed and applied. "[T]he 
Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of the applicable statutes 
together to determine the intent of the legislature." Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 
Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (l994)(citing, In re: Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 
823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992) and Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 97 Idaho 917, 920, 
556 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1976»). 
The clear language of the 2011 amendments, when considered as a unified whole, does in 
fact authorize the renewal of the judgment against Ms. Peterson. A comprehensive review of the 
2011 amendments reveals the Idaho Legislature's clear and express intent to provide for exactly 
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the nature of renewed judgment granted by Judge Onanubosi in this matter. As stated above, 
section 5 of the engrossed legislation states the amendments are to be effective retroactively, 
"such that any Idaho judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired since July 1, 
1995, may be renewed on or before December 30, 2011." 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 104 as 
amended by 2011 Idaho Session Laws § 331. This retroactive language clearly evinces intent to 
"revive" certain expired judgments and to allow for their renewal. The application of this 
retroactivity clause is expressly limited to a specific set of judgments "that would otherwise have 
expired" under the relevant law. 
Before the district court, Peterson argued that the retroactivity clause should not apply to 
her case because her judgment did expire, as opposed to the statutory language, "would 
otherwise have expired." If one were to accept that analysis the retroactivity clause has no effect 
whatsoever. That analysis also ignores the plain language of the 2011 amendments that clearly 
applies to judgments that would have expired as early as July 1, 1995, if not for the legislative 
allowance for retroactive renewal. To accept Peterson's argument would render the retroactivity 
clause utterly superfluous. It is well settled that "in determining the ordinary meaning of a 
statute effect must be given to all the words ... , so that none will be void, superfluous, or 
redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006); Norton v. Dept. of 
Emp't, 94 Idaho 924, 928, 500 P.2d 825, 829 (1972). If the renewal language of section 5 is to 
avoid superf1uity, it must apply to at least some judgments "otherwise expired" under the 
preexisting statutes. That group of judgments that would otherwise have expired, save for the 
retroactivity clause, includes Ms. Peterson's unpaid child support obligation. 
Ms. Peterson's support obligation fits well within the class of judgments the legislature 
intended to allow renewal of in enacting the 2011 amendments with the attendant retroactivity 
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clause. As such this Court should overturn the district court decision and reinstate the magistrate 
court's renewal of that unpaid support obligation. 
3. Peterson's claim that she can escape paying the unpaid portion of her child support 
obligation for Erik because of a claimed vested right in a statute of limitations 
defense is misplaced. 
Ms. Peterson has continuously attempted to evade the renewal of her unpaid support 
obligation by arguing that the statute impermissibly disturbs a claimed "vested right." The 
"vested right" Peterson is claiming in this case, is the right to avoid reinstatement of her unpaid 
child support obligation after the judgment lien for that obligation was considered expired under 
prior law. In her own words, Peterson is claiming that she has a vested right in an expired statute 
of limitations. 
As an initial matter, Idaho Code § 73-101 states, "No part of these compiled laws is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Idaho Code § 73-101. Therefore, the Idaho 
Legislature has expressed its preference for prospectively applied legislation, while still allowing 
itself the authority to expressly provide for retroactive application in its sole discretion. As the 
2011 amendments contained an express statement declaring the amendments were to be applied 
retroactively under a limited set of circumstances, the requirements of Idaho Code § 73-101 were 
met. Furthermore, both the Supreme Court of the United States and this Court have found that 
retroactive legislation, in the context of civil statutes, is permissible. Ms. Peterson has raised no 
challenge to this general presumption. 
Peterson's assertion that she has a vested right in an expired statute oflimitations directly 
contradicts established Idaho case law. In 1985, this Court heard a similar argument in the 
context of a tax protest. In that case this Court stated, 
"The shelter of a statute of limitations has never been regarded as a fundamental 
right, and the lapse of a statute of limitations does not endow a citizen with a 
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vested property right in immunity from suit." Starks v. s.E. Rykoff & Co., 673 
F .2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir.1982). "Where a lapse of time has not invested a party 
with title to real or personal property, a state legislature may extend a lapsed 
statute of limitations without violating the fourteenth amendment, regardless of 
whether the effect is seen as creating or reviving a barred claim." Id. These 
propositions are true because statutes of limitation involve matters of remedy, not 
destruction of rights. Cf Mitchell v. Agents oJState. 105 Idaho 419, 423, 670 P.2d 
520 (1983). 
Hecla 1vlin. Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 108 Idaho 147, 150, 697 P.2d 1161, 1164 
(1985)(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, numerous other courts, including both the United States Supreme Court and 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have recognized legislative authority exists to revive lapsed 
and expired claims. A fairly lengthy discussion of statutes of limitations and why they are 
subject to legislative change, even retroactively, was set forth by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1945, 
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather 
than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical 
and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the 
citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have 
died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost. Order oj Railroad Telegraphers 
v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,349, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788. 
They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate 
between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. 
They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through 
legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate. Their 
shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a 'fundamental' right or 
what used to be called a 'natural' right of the individual. He may, of course, have 
the protection of the policy while it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation 
shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively 
large degree of legislative control. 
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,314,65 S. Ct. 1137,1142,89 L. Ed. 1628 (1945). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had a more succinct discussion in a case dealing 
with student loan debt. In that case the Ninth Circuit specifically acknowledged Congressional 
authority to revive otherwise expired actions, 
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Under HETA, however, Congress provided that actions to collect on defaulted 
student loans were no longer subject to any statute oflimitations. See 20 U.S.C. § 
1091a(a). Moreover, Congress made HETA effective as ifit were enacted under 
COBRA. See HETA § 3(c), Pub.L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, 125. By doing so, 
Congress not only eliminated COBRA IS six-year statute of limitations period, but 
also revived all actions which would have otherwise been time-barred. 
United States v. Phillips, 20 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 1994)(emphasis added). Other similar 
specialized laws reviving specific categories of claims have been upheld with regard to a number 
of different scenarios including: mass torts, securities claims, and as previously stated, tax 
claims. 
Peterson has previously cited Utah case law for the proposition that "vested rights," once 
settled, may not be altered by subsequent changes to statutes of limitations. While it is not clear 
that the present case involves a statute of limitations as such, it is not necessary to reach this 
question. Ms. Peterson misunderstands her own case law. In Roark, the Utah Supreme Court 
took great pains to "note that [the statute in question] contains no express declaration of 
retroactivity ... [and] that the legislature did not intend the section to apply retroactively." Roark 
v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995). The court then engages in analysis of whether the 
statute might apply retroactively, despite the lack of express legislative intent to do so, because 
the statute was "procedural in nature." Id. It is only in this context that the court examines 
whether or not a "vested right" was created. Id. Thus, Roark, and the so-called "majority rule" 
cases only stand for the proposition that "time barred claims [may not be revived] through 
retroactive application of extended statutes of limitations" where those statutes are not expressly 
made retroactive by the legislature. Id. 
The Idaho case law that Ms. Peterson has discussed is inapplicable for the same reason: 
each case cited deals with whether a statute should be applied retroactively in the absence of a 
specific provision for retroactivity. That case law simply does not cOlTespond with the facts 
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present in this case. In the 2011 amendments, the Idaho Legislature made its express intent for 
retroactive application abundantly clear. Not only does section 5 include the phrase, "this act 
shall be in full force and effect . . . retroactively," but the legislature subsequently and 
specifically amended section 5 to take effect "retroactively to July 1, 1995." 2011 Idaho Sess. 
Laws § 104; 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws § 331 (emphasis added). 
Illustrating her confusion over the issue, Ms. Peterson has previously cited to City of 
Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 515, 660 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1983) for the 
proposition that "it is ... the rule in Idaho that retroactive legislation is only that which affects 
vested or already existing rights." In other words, legislation that is not retroactive will not be 
interpreted to affect "vested rights." The cases cited by Ms. Peterson thoroughly examine the 
principle underlying this rule. However, the Idaho Legislature understood this rule when drafting 
and enacting the 2011 amendments. For that reason, the 2011 legislature made its intent to apply 
the 2011 amendments retroactively express and clear in the language it used. 
The 2011 amendments contained an explicit retroactivity provision sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Idaho Code § 73-101. Furthermore, this Court has acknowledged the Idaho 
Legislature's authority and ability to revive an action, even after the previously controlling 
statute of limitations had expired. For these reasons, this Court should to reinstate Judge 
Onanubosi's order granting the renewed judgment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 2011 the Idaho Legislature undertook to rectify a troubling situation in which parents 
who had been ordered to pay child suppOli were receiving a type of amnesty from their unpaid 
support obligations by delaying payment until the underlying judgments expired. Those 2011 
amendments were duly enacted by the legislature and all provisions of the 2011 amendments, 
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including the retroactivity clause in section 5, are entitled to the full force and effect of law. 
Additionally, this Court's prior ruling in Hecla, and similar authority from other courts confirm 
the Idaho Legislature's authority to revive a previously expired cause of action through 
subsequent legislation. 
For the above reasons, the district court's Order on Motion to File the Renewed Judgment 
and Order to Remand should be reversed. Furthermore, in light of the record and law presented, 
the magistrate court's Final Order on Motion/or Renewed Judgment should be reinstated and 
affirmed. 
DATED this -+-__ day of September, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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